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A B S T R A C T
The potential impact of the EU Council Presidency on legis-
lative decision-making has been frequently identified. This
article provides an empirical analysis of the Presidency’s
influence on decision outcomes based on a large-n data 
set. Two counterfactuals are used to represent consensual
decision-making and hard bargaining in the Council. The role
of supranational actors is controlled for directly. The findings
show that a member state benefits from holding the Presi-
dency during the final stages of the legislative proceedings.
Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression
analysis controls for the voting threshold, the type of
proposal and salience.
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Introduction
It is commonly held that the Council Presidency plays a special role in legis-
lative negotiations in the European Union (EU). Consequently, whether or not
the system of rotation for the Presidency should be kept was one of the most
contentious topics during recent discussions on treaty reform. In this article,
I investigate whether or not the Presidency has a disproportionate influence
on decision outcomes. A member state might benefit from holding the office
of the Presidency owing to its prerogatives of making proposals and/or
informational asymmetry. However, the powers of the Presidency are limited.
Some authors even argue that the Presidency’s spot in the limelight puts
pressure on the member state at the helm to make extraordinary concessions.
Which one of these contending theoretical perspectives is correct can be
decided only upon analysing empirical evidence. This article presents
evidence with regard to the Presidency’s influence on legislative outcomes
based on a large-n study of legislative decision-making. In line with the theor-
etical literature on the concept of power, a counterfactual outcome based on
general bargaining models is established to investigate whether or not a
member state exercised disproportionate influence. A member state is
deemed influential if the actual outcome frequently deviates from the
counterfactual in the direction of the actor’s ideal position. It would suggest
that the office of the Presidency adds to the power of a member state if this
happens more frequently when a member state is holding the Presidency.
Previous quantitative studies based on the ‘Decision-making in the
European Union’ data set have found a Presidency effect for the final stage
of negotiations (Schalk et al., 2007; Thomson, 2008). However, these analyses
are based on a direct comparison of policy distances across different issues
and proposals. As I argue below, owing to the measurement technique,
comparisons across issues can lead to misleading results. To avoid these
problems, the analysis presented in this article proceeds at the issue level.
Furthermore, previous studies have assumed consensual bargaining in the
Council when choosing the counterfactual. However, it is still unclear how
best to characterize decision-making in the Council. Thus, this analysis
utilizes two bargaining models, representing both consensual decision-
making and hard bargaining. Although the results confirm earlier findings
with regard to the impact of the Presidency, evidence is also found for the
impact of the supranational actors. This result is in line with the general
empirical literature on legislative decision-making.
The paper proceeds as follows. After discussing the theoretical bases of
the different claims with regard to the effect of the Presidency, I explain my
research design. I include a discussion of the measurement of power in spatial
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models and the two baseline models that are used. I then describe the data
and explain why a comparison of policy distances across issues could lead to
misleading results. Lastly, I present the empirical analysis and the results.
The Council Presidency: Power broker, neutral chair 
or burden?
There is broad consensus in the literature that the Council Presidency
provides the member state that is holding it with an opportunity to influence
legislative decision-making (Kirchner, 1992; Schout, 1998; Dinan, 1999; Hix,
1999; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999; Westlake, 1999; Sherrington, 2000). Conse-
quently, the issue of the rotating Presidency was one of the most contentious
topics in the discussions on institutional reform at the constitutional con-
vention (König et al., 2006). However, it has been pointed out that the Presi-
dency’s powers are limited. Some scholars have even argued that a member
state has to make extraordinary concessions during its term at the helm.
The Presidency gives an informational and procedural advantage to a
member state during its six months in office (Tallberg, 2003, 2006). Because
of its central role, the Presidency can acquire private information about the
concessions member states would be willing to make (Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace, 2006: 144, 150; Tallberg, 2006: 114–15). According to some scholars,
the co-decision procedure has further empowered the Presidency, which acts
as a representative of the Council in the informal ‘trialogues’ between the
Council and supranational actors (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 35; Farrell
and Heritier, 2004: 1203; Tallberg, 2006: 145). The Presidency can, for example,
misrepresent the position of the European Parliament in the final stages of
the legislative proceedings to further its own interests (Tallberg, 2006: 145).
In procedural terms the Presidency has the prerogative of making proposals
(Tallberg, 2006: 116–17; Warntjen, 2008). Proposal power gives a first-mover
advantage to the Presidency; thus the member state holding the Presidency
can reap disproportionate benefits.
The Presidency, however, does not reign freely during its term in office
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 148). The supermajoritarian voting
threshold and the need to reach a unanimous consensus in the Council in
some cases diminish the impact of proposal power. In addition, depending
on the legislative procedure, the position of the Commission and the
European Parliament might also have to be taken into account (Tallberg, 2006:
117–19). Furthermore, the information advantage of the Presidency might
diminish as negotiations go on and all member states learn about their respec-
tive positions. Similarly, a member state might be able to sound out colleagues
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on an issue that is of high importance to it. The same can be true with regard
to the position of the European Parliament (see Garman and Hilditch, 1998:
279). Furthermore, the Commission is represented at the ‘trialogues’ and regu-
larly attends Council meeting (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 34),
putting it into a good position to spoil the tactical manoeuvrings of the
Presidency. In addition, member states hold the office of the Presidency for
only six months. Member states might prefer to wait for the next country to
take over, which might have preferences closer to their own, rather than make
concessions to the current Presidency. Finally, the Presidency can act only on
an inherited agenda.
Because of these constraints, the overall effect of the Presidency on
decision outcomes might be negligible. Furthermore, chairing the office of the
Presidency puts a member state into the limelight, which might induce it to
make extraordinary concessions. If the member state holding the Presidency
values a reputation for being neutral, then its ability to defend its own
national interests would be impaired (Wallace, 1985: 15–17; Kirchner, 1992:
107–9; Christiansen, 2006: 157; Elgström, 2003; Nugent, 2003: 163). In addition,
member states might be induced to make national sacrifices in order to be
perceived as a productive and efficient Presidency (Dinan, 1999: 245–6). As
Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 35) put it: ‘each presidency is judged by how
“productive” it is, thus often inducing the state holding the chair to compro-
mise its own national preferences to get deals agreed.’ Thus, instead of being
powerful or seeing its powers limited in practice, the Presidency might even
feel pressure to make extraordinary concessions.
In sum, although the potential impact of the Presidency is widely
acknowledged, there is no agreement on whether or not the Presidency
successfully influences EU legislation. The literature highlights the voting
threshold, the legislative procedure and the support of the European
Commission and European Parliament as factors affecting the power of the
Presidency. The voting threshold affects the range of actors that have to be
taken into account to adopt legislation. The role of the Council Presidency
also differs across legislative proceedings. Hence, both factors have to be
controlled for in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, an actor might not
benefit from being in office but might benefit from the support of the supra-
national actors. The influence of the supranational actors in legislative
decision-making is subject to considerable theoretical debate (Hörl et al., 2005;
Steunenberg and Selck, 2006). Previous empirical studies have pointed to the
impact of both the Parliament and the European Commission on legislative
decisions (Tsebelis et al., 2001; Selck and Steunenberg, 2004; König et al., 2007).
Thus, the support of the supranational actors should also be included in the
empirical analysis.
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The most comprehensive empirical studies on the impact of the Presi-
dency on decision outcomes so far are based on data gathered by the
‘Decision-making in the European Union’ (DEU) project (Thomson et al.,
2006). The data set contains information on the preferences of all Council
members, the European Commission and the European Parliament, as well
as decision outcomes for 66 Commission proposals pending in 1999–2001.
The positions are represented on a standardized issue continuum ranging
from 0 to 100.
Thomson (2008) analyses whether or not decision outcomes are closer to
member states that held the Council Presidency during the legislative process.
His regression analysis includes control variables for the extremity of the
member state’s position and the average extremity of all actors. Extremity of
an actor is defined as the average distance between the position of an actor
from the positions of all other actors weighted by their voting power and the
importance they attach to a given issue. In addition, the voting power
(Shapley–Shubik) of an actor, the legislative procedure and the applicable
voting threshold in the Council were controlled for. The findings show that
decision outcomes are closer to the member state that held the Presidency at
the time a proposal was adopted (p < = .1). The effect of holding the Presi-
dency during the negotiations depends in some instances on the member
state’s relative position and the voting threshold.
Schalk and colleagues estimate whether or not holding the Presidency
leads to outcomes closer to a member state’s ideal point, using a weighted
mean as a baseline model (Schalk et al., 2007). The weights used are voting
power (Shapley–Shubik) and salience. They also find that holding the Presi-
dency benefits a member state only during the adoption stage of a proposal.
The Presidency’s power is not affected by salience, voting power or the
proximity of the Presidency’s ideal point to the Commission’s position.
The analysis presented here is also based on the DEU data set but differs
in three substantial ways from previous studies. First, my analysis proceeds
on the issue level and hence does not involve a comparison of policy distances
across issues. Owing to the measurement technique, which attributes the
same value for the maximum distance to all issues regardless of its content,
distances between two positions and changes therein (such as a shift of policy
towards the ideal position of an actor) cannot be compared directly across
issues (see below). Not taking this into account can lead to misleading results.
Second, I use a complementary research strategy to account for the different
characterizations of Council negotiations as consensual decision-making or
hard bargaining. Third, I develop a measure to control directly for the support
of both supranational actors – the European Parliament and the European
Commission – to distinguish further between power and luck. The role of the
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supranational actors in legislative decision-making is subject to an ongoing
debate; thus we need to control for their influence separately from the impact
of other Council members.
Research design: The measurement of power
Power is often attributed to an actor who benefits from a given outcome: cui
bono? More specifically, power is commonly understood as the capacity to
influence events towards desirable outcomes (Harsanyi, 1962; Dahl, 1968;
Morriss, 1987; Dowding, 1996). The measurement of power involves two diffi-
culties. To start with, it is an inherently counterfactual concept. In order to
measure it we need to establish what the outcome would have been without
an actor exercising power. Additionally, we need to distinguish between
power and luck. An outcome might be beneficial to several actors, obscuring
who was decisive in bringing it about.
Power has been famously defined as ‘the chance that one actor within a
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this chance rests’ (Weber, 1922:
28, my translation). Weber’s definition refers to the possibility of resistance,
which would be overcome by a powerful actor. This is crucial; a powerful
actor has to be decisive in bringing about the outcome. Thus, power ‘gives
its possessor the opportunity to change outcomes from what they would
otherwise have been, in the direction that the possessor wishes’ (Barry, 1991:
272). This highlights the counterfactual nature of power. If there is a change
that is beneficial to the actor and if that change would not have occurred
without the involvement of this actor, we think of that actor as influential and
hence powerful.
To establish the counterfactual outcome I rely on two general bargain-
ing models, the pivot model and the compromise model. An actor can be
considered to be influential if an outcome regularly deviates from the model
prediction towards the ideal position of the actor and this is not owing to
the influence of another actor (luck). The counterfactual models include the
positions of other member states but do not account for differences between
member states due to Presidency. If member states exercise a dispro-
portionate amount of influence while holding the Presidency, this would
suggest that the office of the Presidency is powerful. To account for the
potential impact of the supranational actors, their support of a member
state’s position will be controlled for directly.
I use two different models to establish the counterfactual outcome in the
Council because decision-making in the Council can be characterized as either
a consensual process or hard bargaining (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Lewis, 2003;
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Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: Ch. 11). The first type of model is repre-
sented by the compromise model (Van den Bos, 1991). It is based on the
assumption that a group collectively optimizes its utility from a decision.
Furthermore, it assumes that reaching any agreement is strongly preferred to
the status quo by all actors. Thus, divisions between member state govern-
ments on the exact outcomes are secondary to agreement on the necessity to
adopt any EU legislation. The argument is that all member states value the
existence of the Union per se and are thus willing to make sacrifices on indi-
vidual policies (Achen, 2006: 101–4). However, the member state governments
represented in the Council are arguably more interested in being re-elected
in the domestic arena. Hence they have rather short time horizons and might
view the European Union as a mere instrument for changing policies. In
addition, after decades of EC/EU legislation, policies that are universally
accepted as superior have already been adopted. Thus, division over how to
amend existing EU legislation will be dominant in decision-making rather
than consensus on the desirability of EU law. Furthermore, decision-making
in the Council arguably takes place issue by issue (König, 2005: 368; Thomson
and Stokman, 2006: 51). The fragmentation of decision-making in the Council
and changes in the Council’s composition owing to national elections impair
vote-trading or other mechanisms that would secure collective agreements
(Moravcsik, 1993: 505; Golub, 2002). Hence, actors would insist on their
positions and maximize any bargaining advantage they might have. This can
be captured by the pivot model described below.
Proponents of the consensual view point to the frequent occurrence of
unanimous votes in the Council even when qualified majority voting is
applicable (e.g. Achen, 2006: 102). However, the recorded votes represent only
a fraction of the decisions taken in the Council, and the mechanism under-
lying voting behaviour in the Council remains unclear (Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace, 2006: Ch. 10). Similarly, the high proportion of legislation that gets
accepted in the EU might be the result of the lack of time limits at the first-
reading stage, which means that proposals can be taken up again after govern-
ments have changed, rather than of a culture of consensus. Furthermore, the
Commission might tailor its initial proposal to the preferences of the member
states to ensure adoption (König and Bräuninger, 2002). Thus, whether
legislative decision-making in the Council is a consensual process or hard
bargaining is still an open question. To account for this, the analysis utilizes
two bargaining models to establish the counterfactual outcome: the compro-
mise model represents consensual decision-making, the pivot model hard
bargaining.
The pivot model postulates that the outcome of decision-making will be
either the ideal position of the pivotal voter positioned closest to the status
quo or no change in policy. Consider a committee that has to make a decision
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on a one-dimensional policy space, as in Figure 1. For ease of exposition,
assume that all members have one vote. If no actor is privileged by the rules
(e.g. no one has agenda-setting power) and the decision is made by simple
majority, then the outcome would be the ideal point of the median voter (i.e.
P4). Under the simple majority rule, the median voter is the pivot, the actor
whose support is crucial in passing a decision (Krehbiel, 2006).
Now consider the situation in Figure 1 if the approval of 5 out of 7
members is needed to enact new legislation. To shift policy to the right, the
approval of the fifth committee member from the right (i.e. P3) is pivotal.
Indeed, this will be the outcome given the location of the status quo (SQ).
Any rightward move from the status quo that is supported by the pivot (P3)
would also get the support of the actors to its right (P4 to P7). Together they
form a sufficient majority. The pivot can successfully insist on his/her ideal
position because he/she benefits from a status quo bias (Hopmann, 1998: 
Ch. 4; Napel and Widgren, 2006: Proposition 1). To illustrate the logic behind
this, consider the ideal point of P4 as an alternative outcome. A sufficient
majority (P3 to P7) would prefer P4 to the status quo. However, because the
appreciation of the status quo varies among the members of this coalition,
they have a different impact on the decision outcome. P3 is ‘less eager’ (Napel
and Widgren, 2006: 136) than P4 to P7 on replacing the status quo and can
hence successfully insist on his/her ideal position. The same logic applies to
shifts to the left. Thus, the pivot model represents a situation of hard bargain-
ing where actors utilize all advantages they have and insist on their ideal
position, rather than opting for a compromise.
Whether or not a change in policy (i.e. a shift to the left or right) is viable
depends on the location of the status quo. This is illustrated by Figure 2. We
can distinguish three scenarios. If the SQ is located to the left of the pivot for
rightwards shifts Pr (I), the outcome will be the position of Pr. Conversely, if
the SQ is located to the right of Pl (III), the pivot for leftward shifts, the
outcome will be the ideal point of Pl. If the SQ is located in the gridlock
interval between Pl and Pr (II), the SQ will prevail, because there is no
sufficient majority to move it in either direction.
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P1 P3P2 P4 P5 P6 P7SQ
P1...7: ideal position of players 1 through 7; SQ: status quo
Figure 1 The Pivotal Actor and Decision Outcomes.
The origins of the compromise model can be traced to several formal and
informal theories of bargaining (Achen, 2006), in particular to the exchange
models proposed by Coleman (1990). He argued that decision-making is
determined not only by the distribution of the preferences and the location
of the SQ, as the pivot model would have it, but also by the intensities of
these preferences (salience). Van den Bos (1991) extended this notion to derive
the compromise model, which is defined as:
outcome = ,
where si, vi and pi refer to, respectively, the salience, (voting) power and
position of actor i. In effect, the compromise model is the mean of the 
positions of all actors involved in a decision weighted by their (voting) power
and the intensity of their preferences. According to the model, the more
powerful an actor is and the more importance he/she attaches to a decision
(salience), the closer the outcome will be to his/her position. If an actor is not
interested in a decision (si = 0) or does not have any power (pi = 0), then the
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Pr Pl
Pr
Pl
Pl = pivot, movement to the left  Pr = pivot, movement to the right
Outcome
I II III
Location of the Status Quo
Figure 2 Prediction of Decision Outcomes based on the Pivot Model.
decision will be reached without taking his/her position into account. Follow-
ing Thomson et al. (2006), I use the Shapley–Shubik power index.
The exercise of influence is identified in the empirical analysis through
the deviation of the actual outcome from the model prediction towards the
ideal position of an actor. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows a 
one-dimensional policy space with the ideal position of seven member states
(MS1 to MS7), the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission
(COM). It also shows the location of the status quo (SQ) and the outcome
(OUT). PM denotes the position of the pivotal member state.
In the example of Figure 3, the outcome is closer to the ideal position of
MS7 than we would expect given the prediction of the pivot model. Thus,
MS7 could have exercised disproportionate influence, possibly because it
holds the Council Presidency. However, we also need to take the distinction
between power and luck into account. Even if an outcome departs from the
counterfactual towards the position of an actor, this might not be owing to
the powers of this actor (Barry 1991; Dowding 1991). As Dowding puts it:
‘Just getting what you want is not enough to demonstrate power, for one may
simply be lucky’ (1996: 52). In the example of Figure 3, MS7 might not have
exercised any influence but rather might have benefited from being close to
the position of the European Parliament (EP). The EP moved the outcome
closer towards its position and MS7 was just lucky to have a similar prefer-
ence. Note that the positions of the other member states are already included
in the counterfactual outcome. If a supranational actor supports the same
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MS1 MS2 MS7MS3..6
COM
EP
SQ
MP
OUTPM
|PM-MS7|
|OUT-MS7|
(..............................support set............................]
Defining success for MS7 relative to the pivot model
Success = 1 if |PM - MS7| - |OUT - MS7| > 0
= 0 if |PM - MS7| - |OUT - MS7| < = 0
COM: European Commission, EP: European Parliament; MS1...7: member states; 
PM: pivotal member state; OUT: outcome; SQ: status quo 
Figure 3 Measuring Power.
change in policy as a member state, we have to control for the possibility that
it – rather than the member state – has been decisive in bringing about the
outcome. A supranational actor supports the same policy change as a 
given member state if it agrees on the merits of the outcome relative to the
SQ. This is the case if they are both on the same side of the midpoint (MP),
which is defined as the point halfway between the SQ and the outcome 
(MP = (SQ + OUT)/2). If a supranational actor is on the same side of the
midpoint as a member state, they are both in favour of adopting the new
policy rather than sticking to the SQ because both of them would benefit from
this particular change. In the example of Figure 3, a supranational actor
occupying any position to the right of the midpoint (i.e. in the half-open
interval ranging from the midpoint [excluded] to the right pole [included])
supports MS7. MS7 has the support of the European Parliament but not of 
the Commission (COM). Thus, MS7 might not have had a disproportionate
influence on the decision outcome but could simply have been lucky.
Data
The empirical analysis presented in this article uses the data set gathered by
the ‘Decision-making in the European Union’ project (Thomson et al., 2006).
The data set contains information on 66 legislative proposals and the decision
outcome. All proposals were subject to either consultation or co-decision,
were pending in 1999 and/or 2000, and raised some controversy.
As I will argue below, owing to the measurement technique used in
gathering the DEU data set, comparisons of policy distances across issues
could be misleading. Yet, existing empirical studies of the Council Presidency
effect using the DEU data set are based on a direct comparison of policy
distances across issues. Schalk et al. (2007) fit the prediction of the compro-
mise model to the data with one free parameter for the Presidency effect to
see if the distances between the model prediction and the actual outcome are
decreased by allowing for a Presidency effect. They also compare the mean
distances across all issues between the ideal positions of an actor and the
mean voter position, the Commission position and the actual outcome.
Thomson’s (2008) dependent variable is the distance between member states’
ideal positions and the actual outcome. His control variables include the
distance between an actor’s positions and the prediction of the compromise
model.
The analysis presented in this paper is also based on the utility change
relative to a counterfactual model prediction and controls for the discrepancy
in actors’ positions. However, the analysis proceeds on the issue level rather
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than comparing average values of policy distances across issues. Owing to
the measurement technique used in gathering the DEU data, distances
between (ideal-)points cannot be directly compared across issues. There are
two reasons for this. First, the end poles have arbitrarily been assigned the
same values (0, 100). Although they have been coded using the same
numerical values, the extreme poles of the issue continua do not represent
the same policies. Rather than labelling the end poles of all continua with the
same numbers, different values could have been used for different policy
issues. As a result, distances between policy positions cannot be compared
directly across different issues.
The measurement of policy positions for the Socrates Directive (Steunen-
berg and Selck, 2006) can serve as a good illustration of this point. There were
three issues, of which one referred to the level of funds and another referred
to the terminology used. According to the scale imposed on the experts’
judgements, a position of 0 implied no funding on the one dimension and
the wording ‘European Dimension of Education’ on the other dimension,
whereas a position of 100 implied assigning €2.5 billion to this policy and
referring to a ‘European Education Area’. It would be heroic to assume that
the difference between no funding and €2.5 billion is equivalent to changing
from the wording ‘European Dimension of Education’ to ‘European
Education Area’ because both are equivalent to 100 units in the imposed
policy space. Averaging policy distances across different issues is roughly
analogous to calculating the mean profit for a multinational company across
different currencies without accounting for the variation in the value of
currencies. Obviously, a direct comparison of the values would lead to
misleading conclusions.
Secondly, the range of possible values for policy distances varies across
issues. The data set includes dichotomous issues. For these issues the range
of values of utility change is restricted to two, owing to the binary nature of
the decision. For continuous issues, in contrast, distance measures can take
on a broader range of values. Thus, the values between the same distance
measures might vary across issues not because the actor exercised a different
amount of influence but rather because the number of feasible outcomes
differs across issues. Furthermore, the range of values for utility change
depends on the position of the actor. If the actor favours a position right in
the middle between the two poles, his/her utility change has a maximum
value of 50. If his/her position is at one of the extreme poles themselves,
however, his/her utility change has a maximum value of 100 (Bueno de
Mesquita, 2004). Thus, the analysis should proceed on the issue level to avoid
treating values that represent de facto different policy distances as equal.
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To calculate the counterfactual compromise model, which is a weighted
arithmetic mean, the level of measurement has to be at least interval-scaled
(Blalock, 1960). To derive the measurement of positions, experts were asked
to identify the most extreme positions advocated on any given issue. Sub-
sequently, they located the positions of political actors on a standardized issue
continuum according to their estimate of the ‘political distance’ between the
various positions and were asked to justify their assessment (Thomson and
Stokman, 2006: 35–6). This data-gathering technique is similar to the rating
questions familiar from survey research (Fowler, 1995), which typically yield
interval-scaled responses (Westermann, 1985). Thus, on each individual issue,
the data can reasonably be treated as interval-scaled, which allows the calcu-
lation of the compromise model. Because the policy distances on each issue
cannot be directly compared across issues, however, the overall analysis has
to proceed on the issue level.
Table 1 describes the data. The unit of analysis is member state issue to
compare across the performance of member states, some of which held the
Presidency at various stages of the decision-making process. For each issue
in a given proposal there are potentially 15 positions of member states, which
form the basis of the analysis. I excluded from the analysis issues where the
positions of more than two member states or information on the SQ or
outcome were missing, as well as proposals that were not generally binding
(decisions). For each of the 94 remaining issues, there are up to 15 member
state positions, i.e. 1410 observations. The position of Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK is represented in the data set for
all 94 issues. For most of the other countries, their position on an issue is
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Consultation Codecision Missing Total
Legislative Procedure 703 (51%) 678 (49%) 0 1,381 (100%)
QMV Unanimity Missing Total
Voting threshold 1,014 (73%) 367 (27%) 0 1,381 (100%)
Directive Regulation Missing Total
Legal form 647 (47%) 734 (53%) 0 1,381 (100%)
New Amending Missing Total
Type of proposal 877 (64%) 504 (37%) 0 1,381 (100%)
Support by Yes No Missing Total
Commission 841 (61%) 510 (37%) 30 (2%) 1,381 (100%)
Parliament 680 (49%) 395 (29%) 306 (22%) 1,381 (100%)
missing in one (Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden) or two cases (Finland,
Greece). The position of Luxembourg, Austria and Ireland is missing in ten,
nine and three cases respectively. Because of these missing data for individ-
ual country positions, 1381 observations will be used in the analysis.
Decisions subject to the co-decision and consultation procedures are
about equally represented in the data, as are directives and regulations. Most
of the proposals were subject to qualified majority voting; 64% of the obser-
vations involved a new proposal that was not amending existing legislation.
Member states often enjoyed the support of the supranational actors for their
positions. The position of the European Parliament is missing in 22% of the
cases; hence the multivariate analysis including a control variable for the
support of the Parliament will be restricted to 1075 observations.
The data collected encompass proposals that were pending in 1999 and
2000. Two countries – Denmark and Greece – did not hold the Presidency at
any stage of the decision-making process for the proposals under scrutiny.
All other member states were involved as the Presidency in the decision-
making at some stage. On average, member states were not involved in
decision-making when holding the Presidency on about 70% of the issues for
which their position is recorded. We can distinguish the involvement of a
member state as the Council Presidency during the introduction of a proposal
by the Commission, when political agreement was reached in the Council
(during the first reading), during the final stages of the legislative process,
and during other time periods in between. In the empirical analysis, dummy
variables are used to denote if a member state held the Presidency at these
stages of the legislative process of a given proposal. Under co-decision, politi-
cal agreement in the Council in the first reading is an important step towards
the final act because the discussions in subsequent readings are based on it.
Under consultation, some time might pass between political agreement and
the formal adoption of an act in the Council because the latter sometimes
involves clarification of language issues. Thus, political agreement might be
achieved under one Presidency but the formal adoption falls under another
one. Including a separate category for political agreement allows us to control
for this effect. To code involvement during the final stages, the date of the
signature was used. Hence, a member state is coded as being involved as the
Presidency in the final stages when a bill was signed into law by the Council
(or Council and Parliament in the case of co-decision) during its time in office.
Other time periods refer to the times during which an issue was pending but
it was neither introduced, decided upon in the first reading nor adopted.
In the 31% of observations in which a member state was involved as the
Presidency, it was mainly while the proposal was just pending (44%). During
its term in office a member state was nearly as often involved when a bill was
European Union Politics 9(3)3 2 8
introduced (21%) as during the final stages (22%). In 13% of the cases, a
member state held the Presidency when a political agreement was reached in
the first reading. There is some overlap between these categories. Particularly
in the consultation procedure, the final adoption of a law and political agree-
ment might fall under the same Presidency. In 39 instances, a member state
held the Presidency both when a political agreement was reached in the first
reading and during the final stages of decision-making. In 5 cases, a member
state held the Presidency during the introduction, the first reading agreement
and the signature of a bill.
Results
In order to investigate the effects of the Council Presidency empirically, I
compare the performance of an ordinary member state with that of member
states that held the Presidency during the legislative negotiations. The
question is whether or not a member state benefits from holding office. A
member state successfully exercises disproportionate influence if the outcome
is closer to its ideal position than the model prediction. If member states
benefit from the powers of the Presidency, they should make disproportion-
ate gains relative to counterfactual models more often when they are in the
chair. If the Presidency is a burden, requiring the member state at the helm
to make extraordinary concessions, the reverse should be true. Finally, the
office of the Presidency might not have any impact on the influence a member
state can exercise with regard to decision outcomes, in which case it fares
neither better nor worse when in office.
Besides the support of the European Parliament and the Commission, the
regression analysis introduces control variables for the legislative procedure,
voting threshold, type of proposal (legal form, new/amending) and salience.
Note that the measurement based on counterfactuals already includes the
voting weights (or voting power in the case of the compromise model) of a
member state. The compromise model also includes the importance (salience)
an actor attributes to a given issue. To account for other characteristics of a
member state, control variables (fixed effects) for the member states are
included in all of the calculations. Observations within the same proposal are
not completely independent of each other. To take this into account, robust
standard errors have been used.
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression. The dependent
variable is coded 1 if the utility of a member state increased relative to 
the prediction of the bargaining model. Models 1 to 5 are estimated for 
the prediction of the pivot model; the remaining estimates are based on the
Warntjen The Council Presidency: Power Broker or Burden? An Empirical Analysis 3 2 9
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compromise model. In a first step (Models 1 and 6) only dummy variables
for the Presidency have been included, distinguishing between a member
state at the helm during the introduction of a proposal, when political agree-
ment was reached in the Council in the first reading, during the signing of the
final act, or during other time periods in which the proposal was pending (see
above for details on coding). In a second step (Models 2 and 7), control vari-
ables for the support of supranational actors were added. These dummy
variables are coded 1 if the member state has the support of the European
Commission or the European Parliament, respectively. Support is coded as
described in the Research design section. The other regression models include
additional control variables for the legislative procedure, voting threshold 
in the Council, type of proposal and whether or not a proposal is new.
Consultation is coded as 1 if the proposal is subject to the consultation
procedure and 0 if it is subject to co-decision. A proposal can be decided upon
in the Council either by QMV (= 1) or by unanimity. The proposals in the
data set are either directives (= 1) or regulations. Furthermore, some pro-
posals present new legislation (=1) whereas others amend existing laws.
Salience captures the importance of an issue on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.
A score of 100 indicates that an issue is of the highest importance to an actor.
A score of 50 denotes a situation in which, according to the expert inter-
viewed, an actor would use arguments but not power to change the outcome.
In the data set, the values for salience range from 5 to 100. The mean lies at
60 (standard deviation = 22), and 59% of observations have a value higher
than 50.
In all of the estimations based on the pivot model predictions (Models 1
to 5), holding the Presidency during the final stages of negotiations yields a
positive effect that is statistically significant at the 1% level. The same is true
for the support of both supranational actors. Controlling for all the other
factors, a member state is more likely to win under consultation, on direc-
tives and when discussing a proposal that is important to the member state.
All of these variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. So is the effect
of the voting threshold. The variable new is not statistically significant once
salience is included in the estimation.
Holding the Presidency during the final act of legislative decision-
making is also beneficial according to the estimations based on the compro-
mise model (Models 6 to 10). The coefficient is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level (Model 6 at the 10% level).1 In line with earlier
studies on the impact of the supranational actors on legislative outcomes,
the only other variable that consistently yields statistically significant esti-
mates is the support of the Commission. The coefficient is positive and has
a p-value below .01.
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To appreciate the substantive effect of holding office during the final
stages of negotiations, we can calculate the probability of success based on
the regression estimates (Table 3). Based on Model 5, the probability of an
ordinary member state without Commission support benefiting more from a
decision than predicted by the pivot model is 14.5%. The calculations are
based on mean values for all control variables and no (additional) involve-
ment as Presidency during the introduction, first reading agreement or other
time periods. This value increases by 16.3% if a member state holds the
Council Presidency during the final act. In comparison, having the support
of the Commission increases the success rate by 17.9%. Similarly, calculations
based on the compromise model (Model 10) estimate an increase of 15.5%
due to holding office. The difference to the increase due to Commission
support (21.7%) is more pronounced in this case.
To distinguish between the effects of the Council Presidency and supra-
national actors across different legislative procedures more clearly, I also
calculated separate regressions for cases involving co-decision or consul-
tation (Table 4). Models 1 and 2 are based on cases decided by consultation;
Models 3 and 4 are based on co-decision cases. The variables are identical to
the ones discussed above. Again, the results show that member states benefit
from holding the Presidency during the final stages of the proceedings. The
coefficients are significant at the 10% level (Models 2 and 4) and 5% level
(Models 1 and 3). Also, having the support of the supranational actors has a
statistically significant effect. Unlike the pooled analysis, the regression
analysis by legislative procedure yields consistently statistically significant
results for the support of the European Parliament for both counterfactuals.
However, the coefficient for the European Parliament changes signs in one of
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Table 3 Predicted probabilities of winning relative to counterfactual (in %)
Presidency Presidency 
during final act Compromise during final act
Pivot Model ———————————— Model ————————————
(Model 5) No Yes Difference (Model 10) No Yes Difference
Commission Commission 
Support Support
No 14.5 30.8 16.3 No 28.2 43.7 15.5
Yes 32.4 55.7 13.3 Yes 49.9 66.3 16.4
Difference 17.9 24.9 Difference 21.7 32.6
Notes: Rounded values for estimates. Calculations based on mean values for all variables and no
other involvement as Presidency.
the models (4). Models 1 and 4 yield evidence of a (negative) Presidency effect
during time periods other than the final stages. However, this is not confirmed
by the analysis of the same cases based on the other counterfactual model.
Overall, the multivariate analysis based on the counterfactual research
strategy yields substantive support for the hypothesis of a powerful Presi-
dency. However, this is limited to member states holding the Presidency
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Table 4 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis by Legislative Procedure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Procedure Consultation Codecision
Counterfactual Pivot Compromise Pivot Compromise
Pseudo R2 .15 .17 .18 .07
Member State held Council Presidency during
Introduction .283 .510 .501 –.022
(.466) (.454) (.446) (.393)
First reading –1.175 –1.111 –.109 .179
(.683)* (.692) (.492) (.443)
Final act 1.412 1.272 1.089 .748
(.672)** (.696)* (.437)** (.402)*
Other time periods .228 .719 .028 –.583
(.527) (.696) (.354) (.279)**
Support for Member State Position by
Commission .638 1.427 1.529 .593
(.239)*** (.226)*** (.280)*** (.215)***
Parliament .578 .752 .639 –.513
(.267)** (.231)*** (.227)*** (.202)**
Other control variables
QMV –.710 –1.232 –.626 .739
(.256)*** (.243)*** (.284)** (.254)***
Directive .499 –.233 .461 .280
(.327) (.326) (.263)* (.223)
New –.481 –.101 1.177 .417
(.276)* (.253) (.304)*** (.235)*
Salience .025 –.0054 .006 –.003
(.005)*** (.005) (.005) (.004)
Observations 483 483 558 558
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include fixed effects for member states.
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1
Dependent Variable
1 = Increase of utility relative to model prediction
0 = No increase of utility relative to model prediction
during the final stages of negotiations. The substantial effect is significant and
is more or less equivalent to having the support of the Commission.
Conclusion
The rotating Presidency is a notable feature of the Council of the European
Union. It has been argued that the powers of the Presidency allow a member
state to exercise an extraordinary amount of influence during its term in office.
However, it has also been noted that the visibility of the Presidency might
force the member state holding it to make more sacrifices than usual to reach
agreements. Two quantitative studies established the power of the Presidency
at the adoption stage. This study confirms this result using a different method-
ology to measure power and to distinguish between power and luck. Building
directly on the definition of power, I calculated a counterfactual outcome
using two bargaining models. An actor was deemed to be potentially
powerful if the actual outcome was closer to its ideal position than the
counterfactual. This also goes some way towards establishing the distinction
between power and luck. A decision outcome might be closer to the ideal
position of an actor not owing to its powers but rather because it was lucky
enough to have preferences similar to those of the decisive actor. For the other
member states, this is already accounted for in the calculation of the counter-
factual outcome. The supranational actors cannot be included in the same
manner because their involvement in legislative decision-making is different.
I calculated a measure for the support of the European Parliament and the
Commission based on the similarity of preferences for policy change between
the supranational actor and the member state. Owing to the measurement
technique used in gathering the data, the analysis had to proceed at the issue
level. Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression analysis
includes control variables for the legislative procedure, the voting threshold,
the type of proposal, whether or not a proposal was new or amending
legislation, and salience. The regression analysis shows that holding the
Presidency during the final stage of legislative proceedings has a positive and
statistically significant effect. The increase in the probability of an outcome
closer than expected owing to holding the Presidency is similar to that result-
ing from having the support of the Commission.
Further research is needed to investigate what mechanism explains 
the influence of the Presidency during the final stages of the legislative
negotiations. The absence of a robust effect for member states holding the
Presidency during the introduction of a proposal points against effective
framing of the issues by the Presidency or the accommodation of the
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Presidency’s preferences by the Commission. Indeed, this study corroborates
earlier findings on the influence of the Commission in legislative decision-
making. However, further research is needed to delineate the causal direction
between the support of the Commission and the utility gains from decision
outcomes by the Presidency. Procedural prerogatives in the Council should
have been effective during the first reading agreement in the Council 
or during other time periods, as well as in the final stages. Thus, the 
findings suggest that the Presidency mainly benefits from an informational
asymmetry and time pressure in the final stages of negotiations. Indeed, the
Presidency might influence the timing of decisions rather than the outcomes.
After it has been established that member states benefit disproportionately
from decision outcomes reached during their Presidency, the challenge for
future research is to delineate more precisely which of the theoretical causal
mechanisms underlies this empirical finding.
Notes
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the research workshop of the
European Legislative Politics Research Group (www.elprg.eu) at the European
University Institute in Florence in March 2007 and at the research colloquium of
the Institute for Governance Studies, University of Twente, in November 2007. I
am particularly grateful for valuable comments by Jan Rasmus Böhnke, Torun
Dewan, Keith Dowding, Peter Geurts, Simon Hix, Bjorn Hoyland, Henk van der
Kolk, Björn Lindberg, Anne Rasmussen, Martin Rosema, Arndt Wonka and three
anonymous referees.
1 I also calculated models including the interaction terms of various control vari-
ables (support of Commission, support of Parliament, QMV, salience, new,
directive) with the dummy variable for holding the Presidency during the final
stages of negotiations. The interaction terms were added to the specification
of Models 5 and 10. None of the interaction terms was statistically significant
at the 10% level. The main finding is also robust with respect to changes in
the order in which the control variables are included in the regression analysis.
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